This paper examines the optimal income tax schedule in a continuous time life cycle economy in which individuals choose whether and how much to work at each date. If they choose not to work they cannot be taxed. The government must finance a fixed stream of expenditures. The average tax rate determines who works while the marginal tax rate determines how much they work. In this framework, the optimal tax schedule is progressive (the average tax rate is increasing) at low levels of income, even in the absence of redistributive concerns. In contrast to the optimal taxation literature following Mirrlees (1971) , the marginal tax rate at the top is strictly positive.
Introduction
This paper studies optimal taxation using a life cycle labor supply model. Following Ramsey (1927) and Lucas and Stokey (1983) we examine how a government should finance a fixed stream of expenditures with only income taxes. The government tax policy is constrained by the fact that they cannot tax individuals who choose not work at a given date. We assume that there is a dynastic family composed of identical agents whose productivity varies over their life cycle in a continuous time overlapping generations framework as found in Rogerson and Wallenius (2007) 1 . A non-convexity in production technology endogenizes entry and exit from the workforce. Agents adjust labor supply along both the intensive and extensive margins. Following Mirrlees (1971) , we allow for nonlinear tax schedules so that agents of different ages and incomes are taxed differently.
Examining optimal taxation within this continuous time overlapping generations model has several implications. First, the tax function distorts two margins of work. At the extensive margin, the average tax rate determines whether an individual works at a given date. On the intensive margin, the marginal tax rate determines how much labor is supplied on that date. This contrasts to standard optimal taxation literature where the marginal tax rate is the central object of interest 2 .
Second, even though the model abstracts away from redistributive concerns by focusing on a dynastic family, the average tax rate is increasing at the bottom of the tax schedule.
1 The dynastic family assumption is not crucial for the results. This setup delivers the same allocation as the steady state of a standard overlapping generations model. We use the dynastic family to abstract from transitional dynamics when the tax policy is changed.
2 Exceptions include Diamond (1980) , Mulligan (2001) , and Saez (2002) .
This result arises because the government wants to minimize the distortion at the extensive margin, enticing relatively unproductive workers to enter the labor force. Getting these workers into the work force delivers more tax revenue than would a higher tax rate on slightly more productive workers.
Finally, the marginal tax rate for the most productive worker is strictly positive. This result stands in contrast to the optimal tax literature that follows Mirrlees (1971) . Though there is no redistributive motive here, there is a close relationship between the Mirrleesian framework and this one. In both, at each date the government must raise revenue from a cross section of workers of differing productivities. One of the main results from this literature is that when the skill distribution is bounded the marginal tax rate for the highest skilled individual should be zero (see Diamond (1998) ). In the standard model, the logic is simple.
Suppose that the marginal tax for the highest skilled workers is not zero. Then extend the tax function beyond the top at a marginal rate of zero. The highest earner will choose to work more and hence be better off while no income is lost for the government. In a life cycle model this logic breaks down. Extending the tax function at a zero marginal rate still induces the most productive worker to work more. However, the increase in wealth induces the worker to consume more leisure at other points in her life, diminishing tax revenue.
The paper in the optimal taxation literature most closely related to this study is Saez (2002) . He examines optimal transfer policy in a static economy where labor can adjust on both the intensive and extensive margin. Our approach differs in that we explicitly model the individual's life cycle. This framework relates different points in the income distribution to a single individual's labor supply decisions. Productivity differences over an individual's life cycle generate the optimal tax function rather than differences in productivity across agents.
Additionally, the optimal tax policies are computed without an explicit redistributive motive by the social planner. Finally, the non-convexity in production technology that generates the extensive margin in our model has important implications for the shape of the optimal tax function.
The model is calibrated to match stylized features of the US economy. This simple numerical setting highlights the important features of the optimal tax functions. With this calibration, we compute the welfare gain from using the optimal tax function relative to a flat tax and find that the optimal tax policy can increase welfare by between .6% and .9%.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and definition of equilibrium.
Section 3 summarizes properties of the optimal tax function that are used in Section 4 to solve the optimal tax problem. Section 5 presents some numerical examples and Section 6 concludes.
Model and Equlibrium
The model is set up in a dynamic framework in continuous time. However, there is no storage technology in the model, so the optimization reduces to a sequence of static allocation problems. The main results of the paper all follow from solving the static problem at a given date. As the model is in continuous time we use the terms period and date interchangeably.
Though the solution method that we use relies heavily on use the dynastic family, the equilibrium could be decentralized into a standard overlapping generations framework with identical agents that corresponds to the model in Rogerson and Wallenius (2007) . We use the dynastic family to abstract away from changes in asset holdings for notational purposes and so that we can easily focus on the labor response to the tax schedule. Both frameworks lead to the same optimal tax policy except that the standard overlapping generations model requires an initial redistribution of asset holdings. Decentralizing the economy is not problematic to the analysis but it complicates the exposition.
Preferences
There is an infinitely lived dynastic family consisting of overlapping generations of agents as found in Rogerson and Wallenius (2007) . Time is continuous and there is no storage technology. Within the dynastic family at each date, t, a unit mass of agents is born. Each agent lives for exactly one unit of time so that at time t there is a unit density of agents of age a. At each date the cross section of living agents is identical to the life cycle profile of each agent. The dynasty places the same weight on the utility of each living agent and has preferences given by:
where J t is the set of agents alive at time t and U t (j) is the instantaneous utility flow from agent j. At each date each agent has an allocation of time that can be used for leisure and/or labor; in this sense time is two dimensional. Each agent has preferences that are separable over consumption and labor as well as across time:
u is assumed to strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice differentiable. v is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly convex, and three times differentiable. Indexing agents by age, preferences of the dynasty can be written as:
Because there is no storage technology, the dynasty faces a sequence of period budget constraints.
Technology
Output is produced using labor as the only factor of production. The technology follows Rogerson and Wallenius (2007) closely. Hours worked by an individual of age a, h(a), translate into output in the following manner:
whereẽ(a) represents a worker's productivity at age a and g(h) denotes effective hours worked from supplying h hours to the market. An individual's income is defined as the output she produces.
e(a) is assumed to be single peaked. It captures variation in productivity over a workers's lifetime, rising early in life and falling toward the end. Figure 1 shows an example of a possible specification ofẽ (a). We takeẽ (a) to be exogenous so as not to obscure our main points. One could in principle use a more complete model of human capital accumulation that includes on the job learning and schooling, and while this would change the quantitative predictions of the model, the qualitative conclusions would not change. A standard model of labor supply would have g (h) = h, so that hours worked are matched one for one with labor supplied. In contrast, we use a stylized functional form to introduce an indivisibility. We assume that at any date in which a worker supplies a positive number of hours, she must pay a fixed time cost,h that yields no output. This could correspond to a commuting cost or time spent surfing the web, checking email, or making coffee. Formally, this implies that for h ∈ 0,h , g (h) = 0. In addition, for h >h, we assume that g is strictly increasing, weakly concave, and three times differentiable. The concavity could correspond to fatigue over the course of a day and is not crucial to the analysis. In fact, in our calibration we assume g (h) is linear for h >h. The nonconvexity in the production technology is crucial for generating an extensive margin of labor adjustment. In equilibrium a worker may find it optimal to avoid this fixed time cost by not working on dates in which productivity is low. Consequently a worker may provide labor services during only a fraction of her life, corresponding to a labor market entry and retirement decision. This extensive margin is the key feature of the analysis.
Government
The government must finance a stream of expenditures {G (t)} ∞ t=0 by taxing only each individual's income. The government can set a nonlinear labor income tax schedule τ t (·) where τ (y) is the total tax paid by a worker with income y. By assumption, the tax schedule can depend only on income and is subject to the constraint τ (y) ≤ y. Because there is no storage technology the government balances its budget at every date 3 .
Equilibrium
Given the sequence of prices and tax schedules, the dynasty chooses an allocation of consumption and hours for each agent alive at each date:
subject to to the dynasty's sequence of period budget constraints:
where z t (a) = y t (a)−τ t (y t (a)) is after-tax income and y t (a) =ẽ (a) g (h t (a)) is the effective labor input supplied to the market and the price of the consumption good in each period is normalized to unity.
3 It would be fairly straightforward to give the government more flexibility by allowing it to issue debt, but this would needlessly complicate the notation and economic environment without yielding any new insights. In either case, the dynamic government problem will reduce to a sequence of static problems, and the interesting results come from the static problem. Amending the govenrment budget constraint will change the links between the static problems, but will not qualitatively affect the solutions to the static problem.
The time consistency issues involved in optimal government policy have been studied in Lucas and Stokey (1983) ; we have nothing new to add to that literature.
A competitive equilibrium is an allocation {c t (a) , h t (a)} a∈ [0, 1] t∈ [0,∞] and a governement policy {τ t (·)} t∈ [0,∞] such that:
1. Given the government policy, the allocation solves the dynasty's optimaization problem described by equations (2) and (3). 2. Given the allocation, the government policy satisfies the government budget constraint each period.
Markets clear.
The government's optimal tax problem is to select the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the dynasty's welfare 4 .
consumption allocation for agents of different ages and solves:
Letting ν be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint, the first order condition with respect each to c(a) implies a constant level of consumption c that solves:
Given constant consumption, the dynasty's problem simplifies to the following static optimization problem:
The government budget constraint is:
To solve the problem it is important to note that the solution to the labor supply problem facing the dynasty has a reservation property: only individuals with productivity above a certain threshold will work. This is formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 There exists a productivity level e
Proof. A necessary condition for an optimum is that there exists a ϕ ≥ 0 such that c, {h} maximize the Lagrangian:
Towards a contradiction, assume that there exists a 1 , a 2 withẽ (a 1 ) >ẽ (a 2 ) and h (a 1 ) = 0 and h (a 2 ) =h > 0.
Letĥ be defined by the equationẽ (
Since h (a 1 ) = 0 and h (a 2 ) =h are optimal choices, it must be that:
Adding the two together gives:
Taking advantage of the reservation property, it is convenient to reindex the population in order of productivity. Following Rogerson and Wallenius (2007) , let e(λ) be defined on λ ∈ [0, 1] where for each λ, e(λ) solves:
λ denotes the fraction of people alive at a given time with productivity greater than e(λ), so trivially e(λ) is a decreasing function. This orders individuals by their productivity whilẽ e(a) traces productivity by age. We assume e is strictly decreasing and twice differentiable.
After the change of variables a plot of e(λ) can be seen in Figure 3 . The highest productivity is achieved at λ = 0 and productivity is decreasing in λ. Using this property, define λ * to satisfy e (λ * ) = e * . In equilibrium, the dynasty decides that workers with λ ∈ [0, λ * ] work, while the others do not. Therefore, the reservation property implies that the dynasty must choose consumption, c, the least productive active worker, λ * , and hours worked,
Restating the dynasty's problem, we have:
The following results about the optimal allocation and tax function allow the optimal tax problem to be solved. The proofs are contained in the appendix.
We restrict attention to the set of tax functions for which the marginal tax rate is not more than 100%. Proposition 2 shows that this restriction is without loss of generality:
Proposition 2 Any allocation that results from an arbitrary tax function can also be the result of a tax function for which after-tax income is non-decreasing in pretax income.
The formal proof of Proposition 2 borrows heavily from Mirrlees (1971) . The intuition behind the result is simple: if the marginal tax rate is ever above 100%, no one will choose to supply labor in the region where they are taxed more than they earn. Given that no one chooses to supply labor in the given region, a non-decreasing tax function can be constructed that yields an identical allocation.
The next result relates output of an individual worker to her productivity. We have that output is non-decreasing in productivity:
Recall that λ is decreasing in productivity. The intuition for Proposition 3 follows from Proposition 2 and individual preferences. Since the marginal tax rate is less than 100%, a more productive individual can produce the same amount as a less productive individual with less effort. Therefore, for the marginal rate of substitution to equal the marginal product of labor for all workers, output must be nondecreasing in productivity.
Next, for mathematical convenience we define:
where ϕ is the marginal utility of income. For an agent at λ, w(λ) can be thought of as surplus utils derived from working. The following proposition guarantees certain regularity properties w that are necessary to solve the optimal tax problem:
Proposition 4 In equilibrium w (λ) is a non-increasing, continuous, and differentiable func-
.
The proof of differentiability borrows heavily from Mirrlees (2005) .
4 Solving the Optimal Tax Problem
Using these results, we now proceed to set up and solve the optimal tax problem. The strategy is to use the necessary conditions from the dynasty's optimization problem to construct an implementability condition. Then the optimal tax problem of the government will be to maximize the dynasty's period utility subject to the implementability condition and feasibility.
First, we solve for the necessary conditions from the dynasty's optimization problem.
The Lagrangian for the dynasty's static problem is:
This yields four necessary conditions for an optimum:
Multiplying the budget constraint by u (c) and using the definition of w (·), the last equation can be rewritten as:
Integrating by parts and using the the first order conditions from the dynasty's optimazation problem delivers a single implementability constraint in the style of Lucas and Stokey (1983) :
Note that the direction of the inequality is reversed while deriving the implementability constraint.
We now turn to the government's optimal tax problem. It maximizes the dynasty's utility subject to the implementability constraint and feasibility. This gives:
Subject to:
Using θ and µ as the multipliers for the implementability and feasibility constraints respectively, we have the following first order conditions:
Arguments of the functions are omitted for simplicity where they are clear. It will be useful to rewrite the first order conditions as:
where:
Note that ψ 1 ≥ 0 with strict inequality for λ > 0 and ψ 2 > 0 because of the convexity of v and the concavity of g.
This differentiability of the optimal tax function is shown in the following proposition:
Proof. The first order condition with respect to h (λ) implies that h (λ) is a differentiable function of λ, which along with the differentiability of w (λ) implies a differentiable tax function.
We can now state the first major result about the optimal tax function: Proof. The differentiability of the optimal tax function implies that the first order conditions from the dynasty's original optimization problem can be written as:
The first equation gives the optimal choice of λ * , the decision of who works, and depends on the average tax rate, τ (y(λ * )). The second equation determines how much individuals work and depends on the marginal tax rate, τ (y(λ)).
This result explains how individuals react to any tax function that they face. The first equation describes how individuals decide how much of their life to work. The right hand side depicts the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption at the extensive margin as v(h(λ * )) is the disutility from increasing the fraction of life worked λ * . This is equated to the after tax returns to working at the extensive margin. The second equation describes how individuals set their hours of work. The right hand side gives the standard marginal rate of substitution for an additional hour worked; this is equated to the marginal after tax returns for additional time spent.
An important feature of these equations is that the tax function enters differently de-pending on which margin is being considered. For the extensive margin, the total tax at the margin matters, so the average tax rate is the relevant rate for people deciding whether or not to work. For the intensive margin, the marginal tax rate is the relevant feature of the tax function. If marginal and average taxes are allowed to differ, as they do in most countries' tax codes, these differing rates can have important effects on individuals' work decisions.
The marginal and average tax rates can be written as:
These equations will be helpful in proving the following propositions:
Proposition 7 The average tax rate is increasing at the extensive margin.
Proof. Differentiating the average tax rate and evaluating at y * gives:
The fixed costh drives this result. This fixed cost implies that a worker at the extensive margin works a strictly positive number of hours. Because the dynasty is optimizing, raising the fraction of life worked has only a second order effect on welfare (the first order condition with respect to λ * implies that at the optimum she is indifferent about raising λ * ). However, because she is working a positive number of hours, if she works slightly longer the government receives a first order gain in tax revenue, the total tax on the wages earned on an additional date. The government therefore lowers the average tax rate at the extensive margin to induce the worker to work a larger fraction of her life.
Proposition 8 The marginal tax is positive at all realized levels of income. The marginal tax attains a minimum at λ = 0.
Proof. The marginal tax rate is given by:
Since ψ 1 | λ=0 = 0 and
+ ψ 2 ≥ 0, τ attains a minimum at λ = 0 when income is highest. The marginal tax at the top is:
Instead of the well-known zero marginal tax at the top of the income distribution result, the marginal tax attains it's minimum at the top, but this minimum is positive. The zero tax at the top result uses the following logic. If the tax is not zero at the top, consider the experiment of extending the tax function at a marginal rate of zero beyond the highest level of realized income. The worker at the top will choose to work more, raising utility and leaving government revenue unchanged. Therefore the the original allocation could not have been an optimum.
In the life cycle framework of this model the logic breaks down. Lowering the tax at the top would indeed allow the worker at the top to work more without lowering government revenue from that worker. However, the increased consumption would lower worker's marginal utility of consumption. This would induce the worker to work less at other dates, which decreases government revenue 5 .
5 More formally, in optimal tax models without life cycle productivity variation, as in Mirrlees (1976) , marginal tax rates at some income level has the same sign as the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint of a worker at that level. This is positive for workers in the interior and zero for the worker at the top.
Here, instead of a sequence of incentive compatibility constraints as in the Mirrlees problem, we have a single implementability constraint (which corresponds to a lifetime budget constraint) with a positive multiplier. This multiplier determines the marginal tax at the top and the minimum marginal tax across all realized levels of income.
Numerical Examples
In this section of the paper the model is calibrated for three different labor supply elasticities to match salient features of the United States economy. With these calibrated parameters we solve for the optimal tax functions and make welfare comparisons to a model that uses a flat tax of 30%.
Calibration
We follow Rogerson and Wallenius (2007) in picking simple functional forms that still portray the key features of the model. The functions for utility and technological parameters are as follows:
The choices of utility functions are common and consistent with balanced growth preferences. In choosing g it is important to make the extensive margin binding for some workers so that they choose to work only a fraction of their lives. The form that is chosen is a simple function whereh is a fixed cost to starting work at each date. The size of the fixed cost is chosen to induce an equilibrium fraction of life spent working by individuals in the model.
The functional form of e is chosen to give some curvature to productivity over the life cycle.
Though it has an initial rise then fall, the productivity profile is probably too symmetric, with too much of a decline later in life.
We calibrate the model for three different values of γ: .6, 1, and 3. This covers a broad range of potential labor supply elasticities. In every case, given the assumption of log utility, . Finally, we calibrate the model so that hourly wages double over the life cycle. The calibrated values of α,h, and e 1 for each value of γ are reported in Table 1 : Calibrated values of α,h, and e 1 for γ = .6, γ = 1, and γ = 3.
Optimal Tax Functions
For each calibration of the model the optimal tax functions are computed holding government revenues the same as they were for the calibrated case with a flat tax of 30%. Since all of the figures are similar, we show the graphs for the case of γ = 1 and discuss how they differ under alternate parameterizations. First, Figure 4 depicts the hours worked and productivity of workers in the economy by their age. The left axis has the units for hours while productivity is in the units on the right axis. The productivity graph just depicts the functionẽ(a) while the hours worked are the optimal choices of individuals under the optimal tax policy. The curvature of the hours profile is largely determined by the labor supply elasticity γ. For γ = .6, the hours profile displays more curvature as there is a larger difference between hours worked from λ = 0 to λ = λ * . With γ = 3, the hours profile is quite flat.
Next, Figure 5 shows pre-tax income, takehome pay, and tax revenue for individuals in the economy by age. Hours and income reach their peak when productivity is highest in the middle of an individuals life. From this picture we see that total income varies dramatically over the life cycle and most of this variance is reflected in takehome pay while the tax revenue is fairly flat.
The more surprising results come from examination of the tax functions. Figure 6 shows the optimal average tax bill for realized incomes. The figures confirms Proposition 7 as it can be seen that the average tax rate is increasing at the bottom of the income distribution.
This hump shaped average tax curve is a feature of the life cycle framework as it is optimal to have a lower average tax to encourage individuals to work a larger portion of their life while the declining average tax rate at the top encourages highly productive workers to work more hours.
This second effect is seen in Figure 7 . The graph shows that the marginal tax rate is decreasing in income. The marginal rate declines so that individuals will be encouraged to work more hours during the most productive dates in their lifetime. This graph demonstrates the results of Proposition 8. The marginal rate declines to attain a minimum at the highest observed level of income (which corresponds to λ = 0). Moreover, this minimum marginal rate is strictly greater than zero. In this example, we see that the marginal rate varies from about 32% to about 20% at the top of the income distribution. Though the marginal rate is highest for the bottom of the income distribution, remember that the average tax rate paid is lower. This can easily be seen by comparing the graphs of the average and marginal tax rates.
Welfare Comparisons
Finally, we use the calibrated models to conduct simple welfare comparisons. In each case, we compare the optimal tax policy with a the model with a flat tax that collects an equal and h(0) = .45.
Conclusion
Taking into account life cycle labor supply decisions makes two primary contributions to the literature on optimal taxation. First, the marginal tax for the most productive worker is positive. This differs from the standard result in the Mirrlees tax literature. If the most productive individual in the economy is smoothing consumption over her lifetime, then setting her marginal tax rate to zero will have adverse effects for her hours worked in other periods in life. Taking this life cycle effect into account gives justification for having positive marginal tax rates for the most productive individuals, although the marginal tax rate still attains its minimum for the most productive worker.
Second, the life cycle framework emphasizes the extensive margin of labor adjustment.
The model implies that average tax rates should be increasing at the extensive margin. While this result may be difficult to implement, it does give some guidelines for labor market policies that are implemented by the government. The conclusion supports policies that encourage people to join the workforce at dates where they may otherwise choose to stay home. This can be done either through tax rates or other labor market programs that reduce costs of entering the labor force. The conclusions of the model should be viewed in a broad context that takes into account all policies that might incentivize work including taxes, welfare, social security, and unemployment insurance.
While the welfare gains associated with moving to the optimal tax are relatively small, it should be kept in mind that the comparison is with a flat tax rate. One might be temped to say that a flat tax is close to optimal. To take the quantitative results seriously, the model should be extended to account for heterogeneity in productivity across workers in addition to over the life cycle and calibrated to the current tax system for more meaningful comparison. While the comparison with the flat tax is interesting and provides a point of reference, we can not hope to approximate actual welfare gains without a comparison to the actual tax system of the US economy. Moreover, the model we present is stylized to emphasize the implications of life cycle productivity heterogeneity while abstracting away from differences across individuals. Specific recommendations should come from a model that more realistically takes into account all forms of heterogeneity in the economy.
Importantly, the qualitative features of the two main results hold up under two generalizations. First, in an economy with heterogeneous agents, the most productive worker would still face a lifetime budget constraint, meaning our logic of the positive marginal tax at the top would still hold. In addition, the average tax at the bottom would be rising for two reasons: (i) to induce the least productive agents to work more and (ii) to increase consumption of those with the highest marginal utility of consumption.
Second, consider an endogenous productivity profile in which agents gain human capital by working. Here, productivity increases as a worker gains experience. This increases the value of working early in life, so that a worker will be willing to work at a lower productivity early in life than later in life. This alteration would not alter the positive tax at the top result. However, in this setting the government has an additional incentive to lower the average tax rate at the bottom. This would induce workers to enter the labor force early, increasing their productivity later in life.
Proof. A necessary condition for optimum is that there exists a ϕ ≥ 0 such that c, {h} maximizes:
Towards a contradiction, assume that there is a λ 1 < λ 2 (more productive at λ 1 ) such
. Since e (λ 1 ) > e (λ 2 ) > 0, these imply:
Note that:
Leth 1 sndh 2 be defined to satisfy e (λ 1 ) g h 2 = e (λ 2 ) g (h 2 ) and e (λ 2 ) g h 1 = e (λ 1 ) g (h 1 ). These definitions give two properties. First:
which implies:
log g is strictly concave, and since {h 1 , h 2 } are spread wider than h 1 ,h 2 , it must be that
Since h 1 and h 2 are maximizing choices, it must be that:
Adding these together gives:
Since v is strictly convex and since {h 1 , h 2 } are spread wider than h 1 ,h 2 , this implies be thath 1 +h 2 > h 1 + h 2 .
⇒a contradiction.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Recall that w (λ) ≡ −v (h (λ))+ϕz (λ). This is surplus utils at age λ. The proof will proceed in two parts. First, we show that w is continuous and monotonic:
Claim 3 w (λ) is a non-increasing and continuous function of λ
Proof. z (λ) is non-increasing. Let λ 1 > λ 2 ⇒ e (λ 2 ) g (h (λ 1 )) > e (λ 1 ) g (h (λ 1 )).
We then have:
w (λ 2 ) = −v (h (λ 2 )) + ϕz (e (λ 2 ) g (h (λ 2 ))) ≥ −v (h (λ 1 )) + ϕz (e (λ 2 ) g (h (λ 1 ))) ≥ −v (h (λ 1 )) + ϕz (e (λ 1 ) g (h (λ 1 ))) = w (λ 1 )
where the first inequality comes from the optimality of h (λ 2 ) and the second inequality comes from the fact that z is non-increasing.
As for continuity, toward a contradiction, assume that w is discontinuous at λ 0 :
Let λ g (h (λ 1 )) this is the hours needed to earn income y (λ 1 ) with productivity of age λ 2 .
For ε > 0 define: v (h (λ)) e (λ) g (h (λ)) e (λ) g (h (λ)) dλ
